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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH BANK & TRUST, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES H. QUINN and 
JAMES H. QUINN, JR., 
Defendants-Appellants. 
REPLY BRIEF 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
REPLY BRIEF 
Supreme Court No. 
The Court should note that the statement of facts given in the Res• 
pondent' s brief is ambiguous and does not correctly state the evidence presente 
'1 
to the Court below. Respondent states on page 3 of its brief "it was mutually,, 
decided that the automobiles be sold through local dealers." There is no evi-
dence in the case of any such agreement between any of the parties that the 
automobiles be sold through local car dealers. In fact, the testimony of Mr. 12 
Jay Quinn was that he tried to get the bank to allow the vehicles to be taken 1 
out of state where a higher price could have been obtained and the bank refus+ 
to do so. (Tr. 2l6). The Respondent failed to cite any portion of the trans-
cript of the trial wherein such an agreement was made. The statement of coun- ~ 
sel that it was mutually decided that the automobiles be sold through local 
car dealers is a mis-statement of the evidence. The Respondent at page 3 of 
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its bri~f states, "Shortly after the December 23, 1977 meeting, the parties 
undertook to sell the cars and the boat." A more correct statement of the 
facts would be that it was the understanding that everyone would participate 
in the sales. However, the bank refused to allow the Defendants to participate 
in the sale of the cars and, in fact, refused to allow Jay Quinn to take the 
Ferrari to Arizona where a much higher price could have been obtained than 
that for which the bank sold it in Utah. (Tr. 216). 
II. ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE MAJORITY RULE OF "NO NOTICE -
NO DEFICIENCY" IS THE UTAH RULE 
Respondent argues in its Point One that the failure to give notice 
of sale of collateral under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code does not 
preclude Plaintiff from obtaining a deficiency judgment. The Respondent admits 
at page 7 of its brief that many jurisdictions hold that a failure to give 
notice to the debtor of the sale of collateral constitutes an absolute bar to 
a deficiency. The Respondent, however, fails to note this is the majority 
position and to include the State of Utah within that list of states. Appel-
lant respectfully submits that FMA Financial Corporation v. Pro Printers, 
590 P.2d 803 (Utah, 1979), establishes Utah as one of the states wherein the 
"no notice - no deficiency" rule has been accepted. 
In a Utah Law Review article entitled "Leases as Security Agree-
ments and the Affect of a Failure to Notify on a Secured Party's Recovery of 
a Deficiency Judgment: FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro Printers," 1979 Utah L. Rev·, 
567, the author concluded that, based on the cases cited by the Court in reach-
ing its decision in FMA, Utah had adopted the "no notice - no deficiency" rule. 
-2-
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The "no notice - no deficiency" rule is the majority position in the United 
States at this timee The author further concluded that in the event the Court 
decides to retreat from the "no notice - no deficiency" rule, that the language 
of FMA then would compel adoption of the so-called Arkansas Rule. The Arkansas 
Rule is that if the creditor fails to give notice as required by the Code, he l 
then has to overcome the presumption that the repossessed collateral is worth 
at least the amount of the actual sale of the collateral or in the alternative, 
to show in fact what was a fair and reasonable price for the collateral. 
The Respondent failed to point out to the Court the significance 
of Clark Leasing Corporation v. White Sands Forest Products, Inc., 535 P.2d 
1077 (N.M., 1975) cited at page 8 of the Respondent's brief. In Clark, the 
New Mexico Court recognized that the majority of the states accept the rule 
of "no notice - no deficiency". 535 P.2d at 1081. The Respondent further 
failed to point out that the position argued for in Point One is basically the 
minority position. Even if the Court were to adopt the minority position set 
forth in Respondent's cases at pages 7 and 8 of the brief, the Court would be 
compelled to reverse the trial court because the Plaintiff did not meet its 
burden of proof under the so-called "Arkansas Rule". If this Court adopted 
the Arkansas Rule as the law of the State of Utah, then the Appellant would 
be entitled to reversal or a new trial on the issue of whether or not the salel 
was commercially reasonable, and whether or not the Defendant was damaged by 
the failure of the bank to give notice. The Arkansas Rule as set forth in the 
cases cited by Respondent at Pages 7 and 8 of its brief, notably Universal 
-3-
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CIT Credit Company v. Rone, 453 S.W.2d 37, (1970), Beneficial Financing Company 
of Blackhawk County v. Reed, 212 N.W.2d 454, (Iowa, 1973), states that for the 
creditor to obtain any deficiency at all, it must overcome the presumption 
that the value of the collateral was the same as the amount owed on the note. 
All of the cases cited by Respondent at pages 7 and 8 of its brief appear 
to adopt the Arkansas Rule. Although, as pointed out in Clark Leasing Corp. 
v. White Sands Forest Products, Inc., supra, this is the minority view, the 
Respondent still urges that it should be adopted by this Court. 
The trial court did not try the case on the Arkansas theory. The 
jury was not instructed with regard to the burden of proof under the Arkansas 
Rule. Under the Arkansas Rule, the bank must prove that the property was not 
valued in an amount equal to the amount owed on the note. At trial, the Court 
submitted this case to the jury on the presumption that the Defendant had the 
burden of showing that it had been damaged by the failure of the bank to give 
notice and/or to conduct the sale in a commercially reasonable manner. If this 
Court reverses the FMA Financial rule of "no notice - no deficiency", and adopts 
the Arkansas Rule as urged by the Respondent, the case must be reversed and 
sent back to the trial court for a new trial because the Arkansas Rule requires 
the secured party to show, by a.preponderance of the evidence, the reasonable 
value of the collateral. There was insufficient evidence at trial for Plaintiff 
to meet that burden. Under the Arkansas Rule, there is a rebuttable presumption 
that the collateral is equal to the value of the amount owed on the note. 
-4-
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See eog., Universal CIT Credit Co. v. Rone, 453 S.W.2d 37 (Ark., 1970). 
The Arkansas Court stated: 
Whenever the value of the collateral is an 
issue in an action to recover a deficiency, 
there is a presumption that it was worth at 
least the amount of the debt and the secured 
party has the burden of proving the amount 
that should have been obtained through a sale 
conducted according to law. Id. at 39. 
The Court then goes on to state that the amount received at a sale where notice 
of the sale is not given to the debtor is no evidence of the value of the col-
lateral. The Court reasoned: 
It is only where the sale is conducted according 
to the requirements of the Code that the amount 
received or bid at a sale of collateral is evi-
dence of its true value in an action to recover 
a deficiency. Id. at 39-40. 
As stated by the Court in Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest 
Products, Inc., supra: 
There is a presumption that the value of the re-
possessed collateral at resale is equal to the 
outstanding debt. Where the sale is conducted 
in accordance with Section 9-504(3), the sum re-
ceived at sale is evidence of the market value. 
But if the sale is not conducted according to the 
Code (such as when there is a failure to give notice 
of the sale to the debtor,) the amount received 
is not evidence of the market value of the colla-
teral. The secured party has the burden of proving 
the market value by other evidence. (Emphasis added) 
535 P.2d at 1082. 
A priori, if the Court here rejects the majority rule of "no notice - no 
-5-
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deficiency", and adopts the minority Arkansas Rule, the case should be retried. 
At the trial, the jury was not instructed that the Plaintiff had the burden 
of showing that the collateral was worth less than the amount owed if it 
claimed a deficiency. Also, the jury was not instructed regarding who had the 
burden of showing the reasonable value o~ the collateral. 
Respondent places a great deal of emphasis upon the case of Zions 
First National Bank v. Hearst, 570 P.2d 1031 (1977). However, this Court in 
FMA Financial, supra, wisely rejected the dicta of Zions First National Bank 
v. Hearst, relied upon by Respondent. 
The real question in this case turns on the Court's holding in 
FMA Financial, supra!' In FMA.Financial, supra, as rightly pointed out by the 
Court, the creditor had completely failed to give the debtor notice of proposed 
sale of collateral. The Court stated that due to the fact that the policy pur-
pose of notice was to allow the debtor to protect its interest and to participate 
in causing the collateral to be sold for the best price available, and that 
the denial by the creditor of that right to the Defendant should preclude the 
creditor from seeking a deficiency. The Respondent claims that this position 
is punitive in nature and repugnant to the spirit of the Code citing certain 
sections therefrom. However, the Court should note that the apparent majority 
of jurisdictions which have ruled on the issue have adopted the "no notice -
no deficiency" rule. The Appellant urges that the reasoning of the Court in 
Delay First National Bank and Trust v. Jacobsen, 19 U.C.P. Reporter 994 (Neb., 
1976), is the correct way to approach the problem. In Delay, the Court noted 
oleb4..or 
that no notice was given the ereaitoF and allowed no deficiency. However, as 
-6-
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pointed out in Appellant's original brief the policy reason for the "no notice~ :i 
no deficiency" rule is obvious. Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
brings traditional conunon law principles of equity, justice and fair play into 
code practice. Such policy would suggest that a creditor should not be all~~ ~ 
a deficiency judgment when he breaks the law. In the instant case, not only 
did the bank fail to give legal notice, the bank also failed to follow the 
notice requirement in the boilerplat language of the bank's 6wn documents. 
(See e.g. Atlas Thrift Company v. Horne, 104 Ca. Rep. 315, 11 UCP Rep. 417, 426 
(1972}}. If the Commercial Code adopts common law principles of fair play and 
equity, it should preclude a creditor who has broken the law by failing to give 
the notices required under Article 9 0£ the Commercial Code from recovering a 
deficiency. Otherwise, the creditor bank could sell the property at a price 
substantially below what it was valued as collateral, and what the debtor 
claimed it was worth, and then recover a deficiency judgment from the debtor. 
See~ Universal CIT Credit Co. v. Rone, supra. The reasoning of the major-
·-· ity of Courts that compliance with the Uniform Commercial Code for notification 
as to the disposition of collateral is a condition precedent to a secured credi· ~: 
tor's right to recover a deficiency, is fair and reasonable and was properly 
adopted as the law of the State of Utah in FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro Printers,.~::: 
supra. As pointed out in the footnote at page 12 of Appellant's original brief,:;~ 
the majority of decisions of jurisdictions appear to have adopted the "no notice 
no deficiency" rule. In fact, one of the cases cited by Defendant Clark Leas_!Ej.:::~ 
Corp. v. Whit'e Sands Forest Products, Inc., supra, notes that even though New <: 
Mexico accepts the Arkansas Rule, the "no notice - no deficiency" rule does 
appear to be the majority rule in the United States. The Appellant respect-
fully submits that "no notice - no deficiency" is a reasonable rule. It is 
-7-~ 
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the majority rule. As enunciated in FHA Financial, this Court should now 
forcefully hold that when a bank fails to give notice of the sale of colla-
teral as required by the Code, the bank will not be allowed to recover any 
deficiency judgment. 
POINT II. THE COURT DID NOT 
PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE JURY 
In Point Three of the Respondent's argument, the Respondent urges 
that the Court did not err in failing to give Defendant's requested Instruc-
tion No. 7. On the contrary, the trial court did err. 
If this Court continues to follow the majority rule that a party 
cannot recover a deficiency judgment if it does not give notice of the sale, 
then of course, Point Three relating to whether or not a jury was properly 
instructed becomes moot. If this Court reverses the "no notice - no deficien-
cy" rule and, instead, adopts the "Arkansas Rule," then the instructions given 
by the Court become crucial to the issues in this case. Since the Plaintiff 
bank's burden under the Arkansas Rule is to show, in fact, that the sale was 
commercially reasonable and that the price obtained was, in fact, the reason-
able value of the collateral, the elements which should be used to decide 
whether or not the sale was commercially reasonable have to be articulated 
to the jury. 
The instructions set forth in the Respondent's brief, to-wit, 
Instructions No. 15, 16 and 17, fail to instruct the jury in the elements that 
it can legally and lawfully consider relating to the issue of the commercial 
reasonablness of the sale and value of the collateral. First, they fail to 
s-tate that Plaintiff-Appellee has the burden to establish the value of the 
-8-
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collateral by evidence independent of the sale price. Also, as pointed out 
in the Appellant's original brief at pages 13 through 19, all of the elements 
set forth in the Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 7 are elements that 
should be properly considered by the jury in making a determination as to 
whether or not the sale was commercially reason~le. Without having given 
that instruction to the jury, the Defendant was prejudiced. Without this 
instruction, there is no basis other than speculation on which to determine 
whether or not the sale was reasonable. Without instruction on the elements 
of a commercially reasonable sale, the jury cannot decide if the sale was 
reasonable~ There was also, as stated, no instruction on Plaintiff's burden 
to prove the value of the merchandise and to rebut the presumption that the 
repossessed property's value equalled ·the amount of the note. 
POINT III. THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
IN THE CASE TO FIND THE SALE WAS COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE 
With regard to the Respondent,. s Point Four, Respondent argues that · 
there is sufficient evidence that the collateral was disposed of in a commer-
cially reasonable manner. It is clear that if the Court adopts· the Arkansas 
I 
I 
Rule, there was no evidence in the Plaintiff's case which would rebut the pres-1 
I 
umption that the vehicles were worth the amount owed on the note. The only 
evidence introduced by the Plaintiff as to the value of the vehicles was to 
show, in fact, the price at which they were sold. However, as pointed out by : 
I 
the New Mexico Court in Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Products, I~ 
supra, "if the sale is not conducted according to the Code, the amount received 
is not evidence of the market value of the collateral. The secured party has 
-9-
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the burden of proving the market value by other evidence." Id. at 1082. Clark 
Leasing coupled with the presumption that the value of the repossessed calla-
teral at resale is equal to the value of the outstanding debt compels the con-
clusion that there is no way that the bank met its burden of proving that it 
was entitled to any deficiency judgment. Therefore, regardless of whether 
this Court follows the "no notice - no deficiency" rule of FMA Financial, 
supra, or adopts the so-called "Arkansas Rule", the trial court must be re-
versed. The bank failed at trial to meet its burden of showing that it was 
entitled to a deficiency under either rule. 
Therefore, the Appellant respectfully submits that the judgment 
awarded to the Plaintiff in the trial court cannot be allowed to stand. 
POINT IV. THERE WAS NO CONSIDERA~ION GIVEN TO DR. QUINN 
FOR HIS INCREASED LIABILITY UNDER THE DECEMBER NOTE. 
In Point Five of the Respondent's brief, the Respondent asserts 
that there was legal consideration given to Dr. Quinn for execution of the new 
note. Such contention is wrong. He has given no new consideration. The Am 
Jur section cited by the Respondent and the case of Southern Frozen Foods v. 
Hill, 129 S,E.2d 420, set forth as Respondent~s legal basis for the argument 
that there was adequate consideration, simply do not apply to the situation 
in this case. Section 227 of Am Jur on Bills and Notes, applies only to a sit-
uation where a new note is given by a third party to cover a pre-existing debt. 
It is clear.that in such a situation there is adequate consideration for the 
giving of the new note. However, in this case, Dr~ Quinn had a pre-existing 
debt to the bank only in the amount of $180,000.00 and that pursuant to 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a continuing guarantee which he had given to the bank. At the time the new 
note was signed in December of 1977, the Plaintiff bank converted Dr. Quinn's 
$180,000.00·continuing guarantee into a note for $198,000.00. The additional 
$18,000 had been advanced to Jay Quinn, Jr. prior to the time the note was 
signed. Dr. Quinn received no benefit therefrom. The Plaintiff bank ga.ve 
no consideration to Dr. Quinn for the additional $18,000 on the second note. 
In Southern Frozen Foods, supra, the Court relied on the fact that the makers 
pr''~c\'~b 
of the note were ~riaeiples in a corporation and that the corporation had re-
ceived the benefit. Therefore, the Court held that they were liable on the 
note. It is clear that a mere naked promise, absent some consideration, to 
pay an existing debt of another is not sufficient to create consideration for 
a note signed as evidence of said promise. Am Jur 2d, Guarantee, Section 45. 
In the instant case, Dr. Quinn was induced to :sign a note in December of 1977 
wherein he became responsible for the pre-existing debt of his son and where 
he received no benefit to induce him to become obligated for the additional 
$18, 000. The bank is precluded from enforcing its note as to any sum over and 
above the $180,000. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellants respectfully submit to the Court that FMA Financial, 
supra, places this Court with the majority rule of "no notice - no deficiency. 
The judgment of the trial court should, therefore, be reversed. 
If, however, this Court modifies FMA and adopts the alternative 
position known as the "Arkansas Rule," then this Court is obligated to reverse 
the judgment or in the alternative, order a new trial because of the failure 
-11-
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of the Court below to properly instruct the jury so as to place the burden of 
proof on the Plaintiff to overcome the presumption that the collateral was 
worth the amount of the note. The case should, under the "Arkansas Rule", 
be reversed based upon the failure of the Plaintiff bank at the trial to prod-
uce any independent evidence to rebut the presumption that the collateral was, 
in fact, worth the amount itemized in the bank's Security Agreement documents 
describing the motor vehicles. 
The Court should also hold there was no consideration for the 
$198,000 note and $18,000 of said note for lack of consideration. 
Respectfully submitted this ~~ day of June, 1980. 
David K. Robinson 
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants 
1220 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
) . ;/ , // a~.~ ~dward T. Wells 
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants 
1220 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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